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Abstract
This paper shows how property rights security improves over time as a result of increasing legal quality
and political democratization in a political economy context, where political and legal institutions adapt
to evolving factor composition of land and capital in the dynamic economic development process. There
seems to exist a clear sequence of di¤erent forms of protection in that it is unlikely to have a strong rule of
law with an exploitative political regime, or to have a democratic political system when the distribution
of potential coercive power is too skewed. The routine form of protection thus shifts from coercion to
politics and then to law. The predictions of the model are consistent with general historical patterns in
England.
JEL: O10, O40, P16, N10.
Key Words: Property Rights, Coercion, Politics, Law, Democratization, Factor Composition, Monar-
chy, Democracy, Su¤rage Extension.
1 Introduction
Across societies and over time, the security level of property rights varies a lot, which in turn a¤ects a
societys order and prosperity (North and Thomas 1973). Recent research suggests that protection against
state predation, which is the focus of this paper, is more important to economic growth than protection
against private predation by fellow citizens (Acemoglu et al. 2005), partially because informal contract
enforcement can arise spontaneously (Greif 2006) and also because such private order is usually desirable to
both state and citizens. The danger from state predation, however, is always present due to the inherent
di¢ culty in monitoring: Who can discipline the state that by nature has to be the monopolist of coercive
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power? The only robust solution is to create a cyclical chain of institutions that form a self-sustaining
equilibrium, providing check-and-balance to each other and adaptive to dynamic changes (Weingast 1997,
North et al. 2009).
Though protection of property rights is presumably a¤ected by many conditions, this paper proposes that
it is essentially determined through three distinct but endogenously connected channels, namely, politics,
law, and informal rent-seeking. The rst channel is the political regime, which determines who belongs to
the ruling group that can legitimately expropriate others using tax. The second channel is the legal system,
which enforces the political power through tax collection, but due to its imperfection may not fully rule
out informal expropriation; the legal quality is optimally chosen by the ruling group to maximize its overall
revenue containing incomes from production, tax revenue, and informal expropriation. The third one is the
informal means of protection that is invested and enforced by private individuals, which will be a¤ected by
both political and legal institutions as well as economic forces.
At the rock bottom, property rights security is determined by the balance of coercive power among
citizens against an endogenously formed state; the political regime and legal quality are intermediate steps
that transform the balance of coercive power between groups, which is often demonstrated and present in
concrete but temporary formats in a short period of time, into durable institutions that a¤ect property
security on a routine base; to credibly discipline these formal institutions from deviating too far away
from their agreed upon purposes, citizens have to invest in informal rent-seeking capacities. The optimal
combination of these di¤erent formats of protection is in turn a¤ected by factor composition and income
distribution.
Though coercion may be relevant in determining both political regime and informal property protection,
there is an important distinction between these two scenarios. In the potentially violent ght to gain
political power between the challenging group and the current ruler, the usage of coercion is more of serving
a threatening purpose or exhibiting a short-term characteristic in the sense that once the balance of power
is made clear in determining the political regime, resources will be withdrawn from the coercive purpose
and returned back to productive usage. In sharp contrast, resources invested into informal rent-seeking
capacities are permanently transformed into coercive forces and cannot be withdrawn. For example, in some
crucial periods of political transition, many people may intensively engage in demonstrations until a certain
outcome is reached, but afterwards they have to go back to routine work and life. So such coercive impact
is not a constantly present force that can directly and continuously shape things; its e¤ect is through the
establishment and function of fundamental political and legal institutions. The daily discipline on these
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institutions is, however, made possible by the informal protection capacities of citizens. That is, if the
political regime imposes too heavy a tax burden or if the law is of low quality, then citizens may have
to increase their informal capacities to protect their properties, which forms a credible counteracting force
against the rulers arbitrary power. Such restraining e¤ect, however, is again constrained or limited by the
overall coercive threat of citizens that is exhibited by the political regime.
This paper endogenizes these three formats of property rights protection under monarchy and democracy.
It shows that the informal rent-seeking capacities are always negatively correlated with the legal quality, while
the relationship between legal quality and the governments advantage in expropriation relative to ordinary
citizens changes with political regime: A stronger government is typically associated with a weaker legal
system under monarchy or other exploitative political regime, but both can be strong under democracy.
That is, a strong rule of law and a capable government can function together only when the political power
is relatively equally distributed among citizens, who collectively can provide a stronger discipline on the
government.
From the historical perspective, the monarch, once established, will remain unchallenged when land
distribution is stable since the coercive power is usually proportional to land size. The optimal legal quality
may be very low so that the monarch faces little constraint in expropriating others. After physical capital
starts, however, the dynamic economic development will change the balance of economic and coercive power
under monarchy, and as a consequence, its legal quality will improve, and informal rent-seeking intensity
will be reduced. Once the wealth and coercive power of the citizens become large enough, they will have
the capability to challenge the rule of monarch and force the political regime to transit to democracy, which
will then in turn lead to further improvement in legal quality and reduction in informal rent-seeking. In
summary, the security of property rights is essentially determined by factor composition and the distribution
of incomes among citizens, where the dominance of physical capital over natural resources and a lower income
inequality provide a solid foundation for better security.
The model predictions t the historical evidence in England quite well. Feudal sovereigns might have
protected individualsproperty against the depredations of other individuals, but they themselves were often
the greatest source of danger in that they often seize the property of their citizens without compensation and
in an arbitrary manner. To establish the basic right of subjects to the enjoyment of their property without
arbitrary expropriation by the Crown, the English barons confronted King John in 1215, the result of which
was Magna Carta, a great charter that helped shaped the English law and political tradition such that the
common law court in England was relatively independent from the Crown in its protection of private property
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rights. This was important to the expansion of commerce, and thus gave the English a considerable lead on
their neighbors (North and Thomas 1973, Rosenberg and Birdzell 1986). The Crown, however, invested in
many other ways (which are categorized as informal rent-seeking capacities in this paper) trying to sidestep
the common court and expropriate citizensproperties. Since the Crowns advantage in expropriation was
still much larger than ordinary people, this resulted in severe violation of their property rights. But it
had to wait until the Glorious Revolution in the 17th century that the formation of a challenging group
successfully established the dominant role of parliament in important policies, which greatly reduced the
Crowns advantage of expropriation (North and Weingast 1989). Such fundamental institutional changes
in political and legal areas were rmly backed up by the arising importance of commercial and industrial
interests in English economy, and as a result, the security of property rights was much improved, which in
turn greatly facilitated investment and production that later on triggered the Industrial Revolution.
Though this paper focuses on the institutional changes at the national level, the order of di¤erent formats
of property rights protection suggested in the model, from using coercion to using political forces and nally
relying on the legal system, also applies to specic conicts of property rights. For example, after studying
how agents in the frontiers of Australia, Brazil and the U.S. established their property rights, Alston et.
al (2012) nd that the de facto property holders in the frontiers tend to protect their properties from
competitors through violence, which however is very costly; a natural step then is to use political forces to
acquire de jure property rights, that is, shifting the main protection method from coercion to political and
legal means.
Such an evolutionary order arising from the dynamic adjustments of de jure property rights to de facto
property rights at the national economy level through political and legal institutional changes is the main
insight of this paper. The underlying driving force of political democratization and more secure property
rights is the technical nature of physical capital, which is easier for its de facto owners to defend their property
rights than land and other natural resources (for example, capital such as technological and business know-
how has to be endogenously created, is more mobile and easier to hide). When capital replaces land to become
the prominent source of wealth, if its ownersproperty rights cannot be protected by existing political and
legal means, they will have to use coercive power to change the obsolete political and legal institutions until
de jure property rights reect their de facto counterparts.
By exploring the inherent links between di¤erent forms of property rights protection including coercive
force, political power, and law from a historical or evolutionary perspective, this paper belongs to a broad
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literature connecting growth, development, and institutions in a long-term perspective.1 Its primary con-
tribution is analyzing the relationship between three distinct but closely related formats of property rights
protection in a dynamic political economy model. Due to the complex nature of property rights security,
there is an enormous amount of work on this subject from several disciplines. This paper is more closely
related to studies using a political economy analytical framework such as Grossman and Kim (1995), Ra-
paczynski (1996), Sonin (2003), Gonzalez (2007), Gradstein (2007), Besley and Persson (2009), Cervellati
et al. (2012). Most of these papers, however, study property rights under a given government, while in
contrast, this paper focuses on the coevolution of political and legal institutions; Cervellati et al. (2012) is
an exception in this regard, but their main focus is on contract enforcement, and they do not consider factor
composition of the economy, which is quite typical in the property rights literature.
A distinct feature of this paper is to explicitly model the evolving factor composition and its crucial
role in pushing the wheel of institutional change during the economic development process. Specically, the
technical features of land, such as its relatively xed supply and di¢ culty to hide or destroy, lead to a stable
income distribution that makes it di¢ cult for other landowners to challenge the monarch, and also makes it
easy for the monarchy to expropriate them in an arbitrary manner. Only after commercial and industrial
activities, which are more mobile and easier to hide than land, become more important in economy, it
eventually becomes possible to establish a more democratic political regime that leads to great improvement
in legal quality and property security. So it is the changing nature of the dominant production factor, not
the income per se, that is of crucial importance in supporting the political and legal change. An implication
is that an economy based on natural resources, however rich it may be, is not likely to be compatible with
a democratic and fair political/legal system to support secure property rights.
This paper also reconciles the awkward conceptual confusion observed in this literature, where the rich
are often assumed to have advantage in rent-seeking, but the poor in open ght. These two types of ultra-
legal coercive power are explicitly modeled and endogenized in this paper. It nds that in a given political
regime, the rich who are the ruling group, must possess both higher rent-seeking power and higher coercive
power in an open ght, because the latter is the very reason that gets them into political power in the rst
place. Only when the poor have accumulated enough income and thus coercive power, a critical transition
time will then arrive, where the balance of power is observed to tip over to favor the poor and lead to political
regime change.
This paper proceeds as follows. The basic elements of the political economy model are introduced in
1See Bertocchi (2006) for a survey of related literature.
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Section 2, and the analysis of the model is in Section 3. Concluding remarks are o¤ered in the nal section.
2 The Political Economy Model
2.1 The Economy
There are overlapping generations in the economy with a xed population size. Each individual lives for two
periods including childhood and adulthood. All decisions are made by adults.
Preferences. Individuals are identical in preferences, which are represented by a log-linear utility
function uti = (1   ) log cti +  log(z + bti), where cti is the adulthood consumption of individual i in
generation t, bti is his bequest for o¤spring,2  2 (0; 1) indicates the relative weight of bequest in utility, and
z > 0 is a constant. The budget constraint is cti + bti  Iti, where Iti is individual is income at adulthood.
As a result of utility maximization, the individuals optimal bequest is bti = maxf(Iti   Z); 0g where
Z  z(1   )=. That is, only when an individuals income is higher than a certain level Z, would there
be any resources left as bequest; this is a reasonable result given that the model economy starts from the
agricultural era where many people live at the subsistence level and may not a¤ord any savings. The total
bequest in society Bt is then Bt =
P
i bti =
P
imaxf(Iti   Z); 0g.
Endowment. The initial endowment of land L is exogenously distributed among N landowners, who
may also generate physical capital kti = bt 1;i using bequest. By blending two distinct types of factor owners
(landowners and capitalists) into one hybrid but homogenous type, this assumption is made only to simplify
the exposition; the main results of the model also go through in a more realistic version. The initial state
of the model economy corresponds to a time when agriculture is the dominant production method, and the
physical capital stock is zero.
Final Output Production. In every period the economy produces a single homogeneous good that
can be used for consumption and investment. An individual with land Li and physical capital kti gets an
income
Iti = At(Li + kti)
from production. The knowledge stock At grows at an exogenous speed g > 0 so that At+1 = At(1 + g),
which is the ultimate growth engine.3 This income function can be endogenized as the optimization outcome
2This bequest motive from the joy of giving is commonly adopted in the recent literature on income distribution and
growth. See Altonji, Hayashi and Kotliko¤ (1997) for related empirical evidence. This particular utility function is also used in
Galor and Moav (2006) among others.
3The assumption of a slowly growing knowledge stock is also made by Galor and Weil (2000) and Hansen and Prescott
(2002). Note that the exogenous growth rate g, though positive, can be arbitrarily close to zero in the model, which is also
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from reasonable production functions (see Huang 2012b). The total quantity of land L =
P
i Li is xed
over time, while the aggregate stock of physical capital Kt =
P
i kti depreciates fully after one period,
which corresponds to ones adulthood (about 20 to 30 years). The role of human capital in production is
not explicitly analyzed in this paper mainly because its e¤ect on property rights protection is qualitatively
similar to physical capital; some further discussions on this are provided at the end of the paper.
2.2 The Political and Legal Structure
The division of outputs among production factor owners is a¤ected by the political and legal systems, where
the ruler may exploit ruled agents through tax and conscation, while the ruled agents may rob the ruler
through informal rent-seeking, or challenge it in an open ght for sharing political power. The establishment
and transition of political regimes are shaped by the balance of coercive powers, which may experience
fundamental changes during the economic development process. Consistent with the horizon of economic
decisions in the overlapping generation model, the length of an individuals adulthood, which corresponds
to one period in the model, is also used as the horizon for political decisions.4
The timing of the model in each period is as follows. (1) Establish the political regime. In the
beginning of every period, the ruled agents have to decide whether to obey the current ruler or to form a
challenging group to initiate a ght against it, and this will depend on the balance of the two partiescoercive
power. The ruler imposes tax on others. (2) Determine the legal quality. Once the political regime
is settled, the ruler sets up the government body that will determine the quality of an independent legal
system that enforces the implementation of the promised tax rate. (3) Invest in informal rent-seeking
capacities. When the legal quality is not perfect, individuals may have to resort to informal rent-seeking
activities to protect themselves and grab otherswealth. Given the political regime and legal quality, each
individual decides how much resources to invest in the informal capacity of rent-seeking. (4) Engage in
production. (5) Collect tax, seek rent, and then determine bequests and capital investment.
2.2.1 The Political Regime
The initial political regime is established based purely onmight-is-right, where the dominant group in coercive
power becomes the rst ruler and imposes tax on others. The coercive capability of a group of Nj individuals
consistent with the almost zero growth rate in the Malthusian era.
4Allowing longer horizons may alter the timing but not the qualitative results of the transition process. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2006b), for example, nd similar results for the political transition problem in a more abstract setting with innite
horizons.
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is
(1) vt =  (Nj)
NjX
i=1
Iti:
The total income
PNj
i=1 Iti of the group members indicates the overall economic strength of the group,
which can be transformed to coercive power through supply of weapons and soldiers, for example.  (Nj) is
the groups organizing e¤ectiveness, which decreases with group size Nj due to free-riding and information
problems. Let vCt   Ct ICt and vGt   Gt IGt denote the coercive capability of the challenging group and the
ruler, respectively, where ICt and I
G
t are their before-tax incomes. Then the relative coercive power of the
challenging group is denoted by
xt  v
C
t
vGt
=
 Ct I
C
t
 Gt I
G
t
:
The transition of political regimes follows a reduced-form version of the political equilibrium in Huang
(2012b). The challenging group will obey the current political rule when their relative coercive power xt is
weak (if xt  x), and revolt otherwise (if xt > x), where x 2 (0; 1) is an exogenously given threshold; the
ruler will respond to revolt by compromise, that is, by extending political power to the challenging group so
that no exploitative tax is imposed on their incomes, and this will lead to a peaceful transition to a new and
more democratic political regime. In other words, the political transition is an automatic process where the
current political regime continues when xt  x, and it is replaced by a new regime when xt > x.
2.2.2 The Legal Quality
One economic benet of having political power is to get extra incomes by taxing and expropriating others.
The other is to shape policies and institutions in favor of ones future economic interests, which is actually
a way to exploit others in terms of future incomes.
Suppose due to exogenous reasons such as how easy it is to hide or destroy incomes and assets, the
highest possible expropriation rates are di¤erent for land and physical capital, where  l > k holds, that
is, it is easier to expropriate incomes from land than from capital. For example, the size of land and its
productivity are much more di¢ cult to hide or mis-report than business activities. The ruler, however, may
nd it not optimal to impose such high tax rates because of negative e¤ects on incentives in production and
investment. Though it is reasonable to assume that such disincentive e¤ects also di¤er across factors, the
di¤erences, however, should be smaller than those in the expropriation rates because the e¢ cient utilization
of any factor requires endogenous e¤ort from the factor owners. So to simplify analysis, we x the rulers
optimal tax rate at a constant level 0 for all factors, where 0 < k <  l is assumed true.
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The political ruler decides whether to establish an independent legal system with legal quality qt in order
to enforce the collection of tax revenue at the promised rate 0. The cost is c(qt) where c0 > 0 and c00 > 0.
Note that the promised rate is lower than the expropriation rates for all factors, which implies that the ruler
has incentives to renege on its promise; for example, the ruler may announce the lower tax rate 0 before
production starts, but ex post it may change the tax rate to a much higher level to expropriate the outputs of
others. Repeated interactions and reputation may mitigate such dynamic inconsistency to some degree, but
their e¤ectiveness can be reduced by many elements in reality such as an impending war or other reasons
that cause insecurity to the ruler (Olson 1993). An independent legal system, in comparison, provides a
more reliable institutional warrant that helps guarantee the promised tax rate to be respected. There are
other benets of operating such a legal system because it also provides good social order and mitigates
property transgressions among ruled agents themselves, and thus may contribute to the welfare of the ruler
for example through reduced cost in maintaining order and support from society. Such benets, however,
are not explicitly modeled in this paper in order to focus on conicts between the ruler and citizens.5
2.2.3 Informal Rent-Seeking Capacities
The enforcement e¤ectiveness of property rights depends not only on the legal systems quality qt, but also
on individuals ability to counteract the legal order. In other words, people may invest in various rent-
seeking capacities to twist the legal system in their favor. For example, they may purchase guns to protect
themselves, establish personal networks with judges, or give bribes. These are extra-political, extra-legal
and often informal means to protect property rights. The overall investment in such informal rent-seeking
capacities by an individual i is denoted by sti.
Suppose that with probability qt an individuals property rights are secured through the rule of law
so that he only needs to pay tax 0Iti; but with probability (1   qt) the law does not work properly so
that no ones property rights are protected by law, and individuals have to use their informal means for
protection. The associated cost in such protection and rent-seeking among individual agents themselves is
captured by a lower income Iti to everyone, where  2 (0; 1); this is a channel where a well-agreed upon
tax and legal system works better than informal rent-seeking where everyone is each others potential enemy.
Let tr  strstr+sti be the rulers rate of success in the rent-seeking game with individual i, where str is the
rulers amount of investment in informal rent-seeking. And let  denote the rulers relative advantage in
expropriation, where  > 1. Then with probability (1   qt)tr, the ruler can expropriate individual is
5Possible interactions between them are briey discussed in Concluding Remarks.
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income by the amount 1iIti, while with probability (1   qt)(1   tr) it not only receives no tax from i
but is also robbed by him with the amount 1rItr=(N   1), where 1i; 1r 2 f l; kg.
3 The Political and Legal Development Path
3.1 Property Rights under Monarchy with Land Only
In the beginning of the model economy, agriculture is the dominant production method and there is no
physical capital. The initial political regime is monarchy where a dominant landowner with land Lm is the
ruler, who imposes tax 0 on other landowners. Since the coercive power of landowners is proportional to
land size, the xed amount of land implies that no landlords are able to challenge monarchy as long as the
monarch owns large enough land. For simplicity, we focus on the case where incomes are identical among
citizens.
Proposition 1 When land is the main source of wealth, monarchy continues without any revolt as long as
Lm  
+ x
L:
Proof. The N   1 landlords constitute the challenging group. Their coercive power is vCt =  (N  
1)At(L  LM ) = At(L  LM ), where    (N   1). The monarchs coercive power is vGt =  (1)AtLM =
AtLM given that  (1) = 1 by normalization. Landlords will not challenge the monarch if xt  x holds,
where xt = vCt =v
G
t = (L   LM )=LM . So xt  x is equivalent to (L LM )LM  x, which is simplied to
LM  +xL.
This proposition suggests that the overwhelming power of the monarch, which is derived from his dom-
inant land size Lm, enables him to enforce a stable political order without challenge from other landlords
when land is the main source of wealth.
Proposition 2 The optimal legal quality is
qt =
(
0 if !mAt  c0(0)
c0( 1)(!mAt) if !mAt > c0(0)
;
where !m  [0    l(1  1N )2]L+ ( l   0)Lm is a constant number that strictly decreases in . So the
legal quality qt would stay at zero when the monarchs advantage in expropriation, ; is su¢ ciently large,
otherwise the legal quality will eventually become positive and then increase over time.
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The optimal expenditures on informal rent-seeking are
sti = (1  qt ) l
Yt
N2
= (1  qt ) l
AtL
N2
;
stm = (N   1)sti;
which together imply that the probability of monarchs expropriation is constant:
tm =
stm
sti + s

tm
= 1  1
N
:
The percentage of rent-seeking expenditure in total income, 2(N 1)N2 (1 qt ) l, is lower when the legal quality
qt is higher.
Proof. The equilibrium is solved backwards. Taking as given the legal quality qt and the expenditure of
others on informal rent-seeking sti, the monarchs total revenue is
max
stm
qt[Itm+0(N 1)Iti]+(1 qt)


stm
stm + sti
[(N   1) lIti + Itm] + (1   stm
stm + sti
)(1   l)Itm

 stm c(qt):
With probability qt, the legal system works properly, the monarchs revenue contains his income Itm from
land and legitimate tax revenue 0(N   1)Iti, which is the benet of his dominant political power. With
probability 1   qt, the legal system is dysfunctional and the rent-seeking game is played. One can think
of N   1 delegates of the monarch playing the rent-seeking game simultaneously with each of these N   1
agents in tax-collecting occasions. Then in each game, the monarchs revenue is either [ lIti + ItmN 1 ] with
probability  stmstm+sti , which occurs when he wins in the rent-seeking game and thus is able to expropriate
the other landlords income at the highest possible rate  l and to defend his own production income, or his
revenue is (1  l) ItmN 1 with probability (1  stmstm+sti ), which occurs when he loses in the rent-seeking game
and thus is expropriated by the other landlords at the highest possible rate  l.
The monarchs FOC w.r.t stm is
(1  qt) lYt sti
(stm + sti)2
  1 = 0;
where Yt = [(N   1)Iti + Itm] is the total income of the economy, and  lYt is the total amount of rent
available in the rent-seeking game. This condition uniquely determines the optimal investment in rent-seeking
capacity stm :
(2) stm =
p
(1  qt) lYtsti   sti:
The net income of an individual i is
Iqti  maxsti qt(1  0)Iti + (1  qt)

(1   stm
stm + sti
)(Iti +
 lItm
(N   1)) + 
stm
stm + sti
(1   l)Iti

  sti;
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taking as given the expenditure of others. The FOC for interior solution is
(1  qt) lYt 1
N   1
stm
(stm + sti)2
  1 = 0;
which uniquely determines the optimal investment in rent-seeking capacity sti :
(3) sti =
r
(1  qt) lYt 1
N   1stm   stm:
Combining the two FOCs (2) and (3), after some algebra we get the optimal results sti and s

tm stated in
the proposition. So we have
tm =
stm
sti + s

tm
=
N   1
N
= 1  1
N
;
which is constant over time, and goes to 1 when N goes to innity. This is quite intuitive because when the
size of each landlord is very small, then it is almost surely that they will be expropriated by the monarch
when the legal system does not work.
The monarch chooses the legal quality qt, anticipating the reaction of individuals in informal rent-seeking
capacity investment. The objective function for the ruler becomes
max
qt
qt[Itm + 0(N   1)Iti] + (1  qt)


N   1
N
[(N   1) lIti + Itm] + (1  N   1
N
)(1   l)Itm

 (1  qt) lAtLN   1
N2
  c(qt)
after plugging in sti and s

tm. The FOC w.r.t to legal quality qt is
At!m   c0(qt ) = 0 if qt > 0;
< 0 if qt = 0;
where !m  [0    l(1  1N )2]L+ ( l   0)Lm is a constant number that strictly decreases in . To have
a positive solution,  cannot be too large. Let
[
0
 l
+ (1  0
 l
)
Lm
L
](1  1
N
) 2 1  b;
that is, !m(b) = 0. This means if   b, then it is not possible to have a positive legal quality in any period
under monarchy when there is only land. The reason is the potential benets of expropriation are too large
to resist for the monarch. This condition is more easily satised when b is smaller, which occurs when Lm=L
and 0= l are smaller or when N is bigger. So in a large country with higher L and N , legal quality tends
to be lower.
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When  < b, the benet of legal quality is strictly increasing over time due to the ever increasing
knowledge stock At, This means that even if qt = 0 holds in the initial periods when At is small, eventually
the legal quality will be positive after a threshold is reached when the marginal benet exceeds the marginal
cost. The critical period Tq is determined by
Tq = ln
c0(0)
!m
= ln(1 + g):
Again a higher  will delay the timing of legal investment. The interior solution qt is higher over time
because At is increasing.
@qt
@At
=
!m
c00(qt )
=
c0(qt )
c00(qt )At
> 0:
The percentage of rent-seeking expenditure in total exploitable income is
stm + (N   1)sti
 lAtL
=
2(N   1)
N2
(1  qt );
which is strictly lower when the legal quality qt is higher. The percentage of rent-seeking expenditure in
total income, 2(N 1)N2 (1  qt ) l; is thus decreasing over time when qt increases.
These results suggest that the monarchs optimal legal quality would be zero when his advantage in
expropriation  is large enough relative to others, and if this is the case, it will remain zero until physical
capital investment starts. In other words, when  is too large, the monarch faces very small risks of being
robbed by others so that he will nd it optimal to have no rule of law, under which he faces no constraint
in conscating any ruled agents.
In contrast, when  is small, the monarch does not enjoy too much advantage in expropriation compared
with the risk of being robbed by others, and so a positive legal quality will then be optimal; in this case, the
interior solution qt will become higher over time because the value of rule of law is increasing steadily due
to the increasing aggregate income. The informal rent-seeking capacities of both the monarch and the ruled
agents are always negatively related to the legal quality, which is not surprising. Given that the income ratio
of these two sides is constant over time due to xed land size and distribution, the ratio of their rent-seeking
investment is also constant over time. The rent-seeking expenditure relative to total income, which can be
a good indicator of waste in economy, is always lower when qt is higher.
3.2 Property Rights under Monarchy with Land and Physical Capital
We assume that, except for the monarch who has to engage in ruling, all landlords acquire the skills to invest
their bequests in physical capital investment and hence kti = bt 1;i. To simplify analysis, we assume that
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the bequest of monarch is consumed by his o¤spring, for example, in the form of luxury goods, instead of
being invested in capital.6 Since the incomes increase over time, investment in physical capital starts when
the threshold income Z is reached for a typical citizen in a certain period tk, where tk is determined by
A0(1 + g)
tk
L  Lm
N   1 = Z:
The income of a typical citizen is thus from two sources, one is the land income AtLi and the other is from
capital Atkti. Since the expropriation rates are di¤erent for land and capital, the overall expropriation rate
1t for any individuals income is a mixture of these two rates depending on the weights of the two incomes,
where
1tIti   lAtLi + kAtKt
holds by denition. It is easy to see that 1t is decreasing over time because the weight on the smaller
value k is increasing given that land is xed while the stock of physical capital continues to go up due
to investment. The increasing physical capital accumulation indicates an increasing economic power of
physical capital owners versus landlords in production, and this changing power balance in economy will be
transmitted to other dimensions in society and eventually may lead to fundamental changes in political and
legal institutions. Though not studied in this paper, the rising importance of human capital would have
similar e¤ects (see Huang 2012a).
Lemma 1 The percentage of exploitable income, 1t, is decreasing over time due to k <  l and Kt increas-
ing.
The ever increasing stock of physical capital becomes a new engine of growth that induces the economy
to grow faster than before. The monarch benets from capital accumulation through increased tax revenues.
Economic development, however, would gradually build up pressure to challenge the monarchs absolute
power because the joint income of landowners grows faster than that of the monarch and so does their
coercive power.
Proposition 3 After tk, the challenging groups relative coercive power xt = (L+KtLm   1) goes up over
time because Kt keeps increasing. As a result, monarchy continues with no revolt before Tk, where Tk is
determined by
(4) KTk =
+ x

Lm   L;
6As long as the monarch is relatively less e¤ective in accumulating physical capital than the others as a whole, the main
results will go through.
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while revolt occurs at the rst period after Tk, which leads to democracy where all landowners share political
power.
This proposition makes it clear that the driving force of the increasing coercive power of the challenging
group is the ever increasing physical capital Kt, and when it becomes large enough at Tk, the landowners
are capable of challenging the monarch. Condition (4) shows that when the coordination e¤ectiveness  is
smaller or when Lm is bigger, the political transition time Tk is reached later. The proof of this proposition
is straightforward and hence omitted.
The optimal legal quality and expenditure on rent-seeking can also be solved similarly as before.
Proposition 4 The marginal benet of improving legal quality is higher when the physical capital stock
is larger, and thus the legal quality is higher than before and keeps improving over time. In any period
t 2 [tk; Tk], the optimal legal quality under monarchy with Kt > 0 is
qt =
(
0 if !tAt  c0(0)
c0( 1)(!tAt) if !tAt > c0(0)
;
where !t  !m + [0   k(1  1N )2]Kt. The optimal expenditures on rent-seeking are
stm = (1  qt)At( lL+ kKt)=N2;
stm = (N   1)sti:
The probability of monarchs expropriation tm = 1  1N is the same as before.
The percentage of rent-seeking expenditure in total income,
stm + (N   1)sti
At(L+Kt)
= (1  qt )[ l   ( l   k)
Kt
L+Kt
]
2(N   1)
N2
;
is strictly lower than before, and it decreases in both legal quality qt and physical capital stock Kt.
Proof. In the Appendix.
After physical capital investment starts, the percentage of total exploitable income in the total income,
 lL+kKt
L+Kt
, is lower than before. This is the underlying reason for why the legal quality is higher than before,
and thus the percentage of rent-seeking expenditure in the total income is lower than before. The expenditure
ratio of informal rent-seeking between the monarch and the ruled agents, however, stays constant over time,
which is because the amounts of their investment are proportional to the total exploitable income, and also
because the political regime is still the same.
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3.3 Property Rights under Democracy
After Tk, the political regime becomes democracy where all individuals share political rights. To simplify
the algebra, we assume that once under democracy the original monarch becomes indistinguishable from any
typical citizens, all having identical land and physical capital. This means that all need to pay the same tax
rate 0, but they also share the tax revenue. There is no exploitable tax anymore, so that 0 = 0 is used;
there may be taxes for public goods purpose, but this is not considered here. Each citizen has a probability
p 2 (0; 1) to be selected as the ruler, whose role is then similar to the median voter in the majority voting
model. This is meant to keep consistency with the earlier analysis of a one-man government model where
details of government operation are not explicitly considered.
Once a ruler is selected through a random and exogenous process, the timing of the decision-making
sequence is still the same as before. The only change is that the legal quality qt has to be decided ex
ante, before the identity of the ruler is revealed in the voting process. This implies that there is dynamic
inconsistency in democracy. Ex ante, everyone desires a higher legal quality, but ex post, once selected, the
ruler wants a lower legal quality. So transparency on legal enforcement is needed to ensure that the agreed
upon qt will not be changed. The importance of a written constitution and the di¢ culty in changing it can
be justied in this context. But of course, the ultimate force underlying the adherence to qt by any ruler is
the equal political and coercive power among all citizens; once qt is violated, the ruler will be stripped o¤
power by others in the political game.
Proposition 5 Under democracy, the optimal legal quality is determined by
(1  pN)[(1  1
N2
)  1
(N   1) ] +
2(1  p)
N2

1tIti   c0(qt ) = 0:
The relationship between qt and  is the opposite compared with monarchy; now when  is larger, q

t is
also higher. The legal quality is also higher when the probability of a typical citizen to become the ruler, p,
is smaller. The informal rent-seeking expenditures follow the same equations as before. The optimal legal
quality is higher than that under monarchy.
Proof. In the Appendix.
This proposition suggests that the relationship between qt and  is ipped. Before, under monarchy,
when  is larger, qt is lower because they are substitutes in generating revenues for the ruler. But now they
become complementary: when  is larger, qt needs also to be higher in order to curb the political power of
the ruler. One can also imagine that the opposite direction is also true: when the legal quality is higher, then
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the governments power or capacity  can also be higher because the government now can be trusted more.
That is, a strong rule of law allows the government to play a bigger role in the economy. There is a positive
relationship between qt and  under democracy, but a negative relationship under a non-democratic or an
exploitable political regime. This seems to be a new result in the literature.7 In other words, a strong rule
of law and a capable government can function together only when the political power is relatively equally
distributed among citizens.
Is legal quality higher in democracy? It should be because in democracy the legal quality is determined by
taking into consideration of the ruled citizenswelfare. Since they are relatively disadvantaged in rent-seeking
compared with the ruler, they would prefer legal protection more than the ruler. Is informal rent-seeking less
intensive under democracy than monarchy? The answer is yes given that the legal quality is much higher
under democracy. All these elements considered altogether, the security of property rights is much higher
under democracy.
4 Concluding Remarks
Secure property rights are widely recognized as a crucial condition for economic growth. But how the overall
security level is determined in a society is such a complex matter that there is still no clear understanding.
This paper shows how property rights security improves over time as a result of increasing legal quality
and political democratization in a political economy context, where political and legal institutions adapt to
evolving factor composition in the dynamic economic development process. When land is the prominent
production factor, property security against state predation is low because land is easy to be expropriated
without reducing productivity and also because a small group can accumulate and manage a big land size.
Only when physical capital, as represented by technical know-how and business networks, becomes such a
dominant source of wealth that enables its diverse owners to defend themselves in collective actions, would the
formal institutions supporting secure property rights become established and sustainable. This transition,
however, is far from automatic, and often associated with open political ghts, regular checking on the
quality of enforcement, and credible threats whenever security falls below the expected level. The capability
to transform economic and other resources into coercive power when necessary is also important.
Another insight emerging from the analysis is a natural order of institutions: The states power as
7Besley and Persson (2009), for example, proposes that investments in legal and scal capacity are often complements. In
their model, however, property rights refer to protection against risk of expropriation by other private agents and not by the
government. Government expropriation is ruled out by assumption.
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embodied by formal political and legal institutions is earned initially and has to be re-conrmed in each
period by the balance of raw coercive power, which usually takes a dormant format that can be, if necessary,
transformed from economic and other resources. So it is very unlikely that a high quality of legal system
can function well when the political system is not fundamentally (rather than nominally) democratic in the
sense that majority of citizensinterests are properly represented; and furthermore, it is also very unlikely
that a democratic political system can function well when most citizens are not important factor owners
that can defend themselves against state predation either individually or collectively.
Due to the extremely complex nature of property rights security issues, many important dimensions are
not explicitly modeled in this paper. For instance, the interaction between state predation and contract
enforcement, though not studied in this paper, seems to be an important topic that deserves further research
(Greif 2005). A potentially fruitful idea is that an exogenous increase of commercial activities may, through
economy of scale, enable the provision of better legal contract enforcement, and then help facilitate the rule
of law to spread to other areas of property rights protection. That is, better institutions in curbing private
predation may prove to be a convenient and less painful way than political confrontation to gradually impose
e¤ective constraints on state predation. Another example is about the role of the states scal need and
capacity (Tilly 1990), which may vary a lot due to geopolitical conditions, could also be crucial in determining
the potential combination of political and legal institutions of property rights security.
Another possible extension of the paper is to study the unique e¤ects of the increasing importance of
human capital (Goldin 2001) on the protection formats of property rights. Though human capital is similar
to physical capital in that both have to be invested endogenously and are more mobile, their di¤erences are
also quite substantial. For example, the possessors of human capital face more constraints in defending their
property rights than physical capital owners simply because of the non-separability of human capital with its
owner. Individuals also face the problem of diversication due to specialization of labor: If one is engaged in
full time production, he is not able to become intensively involved in rent-seeking activities either in terms
of time, e¤ort, or skill constraints. A business owner, in contrast, can typically delegate some functions
to others and actively participate in political activities. These di¤erences and the sheer number of human
capital owners would imply di¤erent forms of political and legal institutions when human capital becomes
the dominant source of wealth in economy.
APPENDIX: Proofs
Proposition 4.
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Proof. The equilibrium is solved backwards. Taking as given the legal quality qt and the expenditure of
others sti, the monarchs total revenue is
max
stm
qt[0(N 1)Iti+Itm]+(1 qt)


stm
stm + sti
[(N   1)1tIti + Itm] + (1   stm
stm + sti
)(1   l)Itm

 stm c(qt):
The FOC wrt stm is
(1  qt) sti
(stm + sti)2
[(N   1)1tIti +  lItm)  1 = 0;
which uniquely determines the optimal investment in rent-seeking capacity stm :
(5) stm =
p
(1  qt)[(N   1)1tIti +  lItm]sti   sti:
Note that (N   1)1tIti +  lItm = At[ lL+ kKt] is the total exploitable income.
The net income of an individual i is
Iqti  maxsti qt(1  0)Iti + (1  qt)

(1   stm
stm + sti
)(Iti +
 lItm
N   1) + 
stm
stm + sti
(1  1t)Iti

  sti;
taking as given the expenditure of others. The FOC for interior solution is
(1  qt) stm
(stm + sti)2
(1tIti +
 lItm
N   1)  1 = 0;
which uniquely determines the optimal investment in rent-seeking capacity sti :
(6) sti =
r
(1  qt)(1tIti +  lItm
N   1)stm   stm:
It is easy to see that sti strictly increases in the potential gain in expropriation, (1   qt)[(N   1)1tIti +
 lItm] = (1  qt)At[ lL+ kKt], and thus is higher when the legal quality qt is lower.
Combining the two FOCs (5) and (6), we get two values of sti + s

tm that must be equal to each other,
and this leads to
stm = (N   1)sti;
Then we get from (5) that
sti + s

tm =
q
(1  qt)[ lL+ kKt]sti = Nsti
which after some algebra leads to
sti = (1  qt)At( lL+ kKt)=N2;
stm = (1  qt)At( lL+ kKt)
N   1
N2
:
So we have
tm =
stm
sti + s

tm
= 1  1
N
:
The total expenditure is
(N   1)sti + stm = (1  qt)At( lL+ kKt)=N:
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Anticipating the reaction of individuals in informal rent-seeking capacity investment, the monarch has
to choose the legal quality qt. The objective function for the ruler becomes
max
qt
qt[0(N   1)Iti + Itm] + (1  qt)


N   1
N
[(N   1)1tIti + Itm] + (1  N   1
N
)(1   l)Itm

 (1  qt)At( lL+ kKt) (N   1)
N2
  c(qt);
which is simplied to
max
qt
qtAt[0L+ (1  0)Lm + 0Kt] + (1  qt)At

[ lL+ kKt](1  1
N
)2 + (1   l)Lm

  c(qt):
The FOC w.r.t to legal quality qt is
At

[0    l(1  1
N
)2]L+ ( l   0)Lm + [0   k(1  1
N
)2]Kt

  c0(qt) = 0 if qt > 0;
< 0 if qt = 0:
This condition has an additional term [0 k(1  1N )2]Kt > 0 compared with before, which implies that
the marginal benet of improving legal quality is higher when physical capital stock is larger.
The percentage of rent-seeking expenditure in total exploitable income is
stm + (N   1)sti
At( lL+ kKt)
= (1  qt )
2(N   1)
N2
;
which is strictly lower when the legal quality qt is higher. The percentage of rent-seeking expenditure in
total income is
stm + (N   1)sti
At(L+Kt)
= 2(1  qt )
 lL+ kKt
L+Kt
2(N   1)
N2
= 2(1  qt )
 lL+  lKt   ( l   k)Kt
L+Kt
2(N   1)
N2
= 2(1  qt )[ l   ( l   k)
Kt
L+Kt
]
2(N   1)
N2
:
So it is lower when Kt is higher. It is lower than before because the percentage of total exploitable income
in the total income, 1t =  lL+kKtL+Kt , is lower than before.
Proposition 5.
Proof. The equilibrium is solved backwards. Taking as given the legal quality qt and the expenditure of
others sti, the elected rulers total revenue is
Iqtm  max
stm
qtItm + (1  qt)


stm
stm + sti
[(N   1)1tIti + Itm] + (1   stm
stm + sti
)(1  1t)Itm

  stm   c(qt):
Now the benet of legal system does not include tax revenue, only protection of ones own income. The FOC
wrt stm is
(1  qt) sti
(stm + sti)2
1t[(N   1)Iti + Itm]  1 = 0;
which uniquely determines the optimal investment in rent-seeking capacity stm :
stm =
p
(1  qt)1t[(N   1)Iti + Itm]sti   sti:
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Note that 1t[(N   1)Iti + Itm] = At[ lL+ kKt] is the total exploitable income as before.
The net income of an individual i is
Iqti  maxsti qtIti + (1  qt)

(1   stm
stm + sti
)(Iti +
1tItm
(N   1)) + 
stm
stm + sti
(1  1t)Iti

  sti;
taking as given the expenditure of others. The FOC for interior solution is
(1  qt) stm
(stm + sti)2
1t(Iti +
Itm
(N   1))  1 = 0;
which uniquely determines the optimal investment in rent-seeking capacity sti :
sti =
s
(1  qt)1t(Iti + Itm
(N   1))stm   stm:
It is easy to see that sti strictly increases in the potential gain in expropriation, and thus is higher when the
legal quality qt is lower.
Combining the two FOCs, we get
sti = (1  qt)At( lL+ kKt)=N2;
stm = (1  qt)At( lL+ kKt)
N   1
N2
:
So we have
tm =
stm
sti + s

tm
= 1  1
N
:
The total expenditure is
(N   1)sti + stm = 2(1  qt)At( lL+ kKt)
N   1
N2
:
The legal quality is chosen in the voting process before the rulers identity is revealed. Anticipating the
reaction of individuals in informal rent-seeking capacity investment, the objective function of a typical voter
is
max
qt
pIqtm + (1  p)Iqti = Iti   (1  qt)

(1  pN)[(1  1
N2
)  1
(N   1) ] +
2(1  p)
N2

1tIti   c(qt):
The FOC is 
(1  pN)[(1  1
N2
)  1
(N   1) ] +
2(1  p)
N2

1tIti   c0(qt ) = 0:
So qt is higher when p is lower and when  is higher, because both imply that the rulers power of expropriation
is higher so that a better legal quality is needed to discipline him.
We can compare the marginal benets of improving legal quality between monarchy and democracy. Let
Vmt = At

[0    l(1  1
N
)2]L+ ( l   0)Lm + [0   k(1  1
N
)2]Kt

denote the marginal benet under monarchy, and
Vdt = At

(1  pN)[(1  1
N2
)  1
(N   1) ] + 2(1  p)
1
N2

[ lL+ kKt]
N
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denote the marginal benet under democracy. Then we need to show Vmt < Vdt. As long as
(1  pN)[(1  1
N2
)  1
(N   1) ] + 2(1  p)
1
N2
>
0
k
  (1  1
N
)2;
the ever growing physical stock will guarantee that Vmt < Vdt holds sooner or later. A su¢ cient condition is
k[2(1  p) 1
N2
+ (1  1
N
)2] > 0;
which is true when  and N are large enough.
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